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 1 
SILENCE SHOULD NOT SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS: 




On January 11, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Salinas v. Texas, a case in 
which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the highest court for criminal cases in Texas, held 
that the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination did not extend to a 
defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.1  In 1992, Houston police officers discovered two 
homicide victims and their investigation led to defendant Genovevo Salinas.
2
  Salinas did not 
respond in the face of questioning that purportedly connected him to the murders.
3
  The Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals held that, at the defendant’s trial in the 230th District Court, the 
prosecution could comment on the defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, even though the 
defendant did not testify.
4
  The issue certified to the Supreme Court was “[w]hether or under 
what circumstances the Fifth Amendment's Self-incrimination Clause protects a defendant's 
                                                             
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Pepperdine University. 
1 Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. granted, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 928 (U.S. 
Jan. 11, 2013) (No. 12–246).  Genovevo Salinas was convicted of murder and appealed the use of his silence as 
substantive evidence of his guilt at trial.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that Salinas’ interaction with 
police officers was not compelled in the pre-arrest, pre-Miranda circumstances and therefore the Fifth Amendment 
did not apply to statements he had allegedly made to officers because such statements were not compelled self-
incrimination.  Id.  
2 Id.  
3 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Salinas v. Texas, No. 12-246, WL 3645103, at *5 (2012).  The prosecutor 
commented on the defendant’s silence and insinuated that an innocent man would immediately dispel having any 
connection to the crime.  
“The police asked the defendant if a shotgun recovered from his home would match casings found by the 
bodies at the crime scene, to which defendant did not respond. The police officer testified that he wouldn’t 
answer that question . . . You know, if you asked somebody - there is a murder in New York City, is your 
gun going to match up the murder in New York City?  Is your DNA going to be on that body or that 
person's fingernails?  Is [sic] your fingerprints going to be on that body? You are going to say no.  An 
innocent person is going to say: What are you talking about?  I didn't do that.  I wasn’t there.  He didn’t 
respond that way.  He didn’t say: No, it’s not going to match up.  It’s my shotgun.  It’s been in our house. 
What are you talking about?  He wouldn’t answer that question.” 
4 Salinas, 369 S.W.3d at 179.  
 2 
refusal to answer police questioning before he has been arrested or read his Miranda rights.”5  In 
the state case, the court wrestled with the federal constitutional right against self-incrimination 
encompassed in the Fifth Amendment.
6
   
Even though Miranda
7
 warnings should normally precede custodial interrogation and 
inform a defendant of his right to remain silent in the face of that interrogation, government 
attorneys, as well as state prosecutors, argue that a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda8 silence 
during informal, non-custodial encounters with law enforcement demonstrates substantive 
evidence his guilt.
9
  The use of this silence presents a unique problem as it is distinct from any 
other type of silence the Supreme Court has addressed before.  In Doyle v. Ohio, the Supreme 
Court grappled with the issue of whether post-arrest, post-Miranda silence could be used for 
impeachment.
10
  There, the Court held that the defendant’s silence following arrest and receipt of 
the Miranda warnings carries an implied assurance that it will not be used against him.
11
   
Prosecutors were therefore barred from commenting on such silence.
12
  In Griffin v. California, 
the Supreme Court further prohibited the use of post-Miranda silence to impeach a defendant on 
his decision not to testify at trial.
13
  There, the prosecution directly addressed the defendant’s 
silence during his trial, which led to his first-degree murder conviction.
14
  The Supreme Court 
                                                             
5 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3. 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art I, § 10 (“[The accused] shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself . . .”).  
7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); see infra Part I-B.  
8 The term “pre-arrest, pre-Miranda” refers to the period before a suspect has been arrested and received his 
Miranda warnings. 
9 Mikah K. Story Thompson, Methinks the Lady Doth Protest Too Little: Reassessing the Probative Value of 
Silence, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 21, 21 (2008) (“The syllogism goes as follows: major premise - Innocent people 
proclaim their innocence in response to an accusation; minor premise - Defendant failed to respond to an officer’s 
accusation that he killed his wife; conclusion - Defendant is guilty of killing his wife.  This syllogism is the basis 
upon which courts and lawmakers allow a defendant’s silence to be admitted into evidence as proof of guilt.”).  
10 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).  
11 Id. at 614 (“It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.”).  
12 Id.  
13 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
14 Id.  
 3 
held that the Fifth Amendment forbid prosecutors from commenting at trial on the accused’s 
refusal to testify, because a “comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the inquisitorial 
system of criminal justice, which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.”15  Yet, a defendant’s pre-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence is inherently distinct from cases like Doyle and Griffin where, like in 
Salinas, the defendant does not testify and the prosecutor does not seek to impeach the defendant 
with the silence, but rather presents the silence as substantive evidence for the jury to consider 
when weighing the defendant’s guilt.  
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Salinas v. Texas represents the first step in 
clarifying the issue of whether pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive 
evidence of a defendant’s guilt.  It follows many years of conflict and divergent opinions from 
the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals.
16
  Several circuits hold that using pre-arrest silence 
as substantive evidence of guilt violates the privilege against self-incrimination; several others 
hold that it does not; and some address the use of post-arrest silence in the same discussion.
17
   
This Comment recommends that the Supreme Court in Salinas v. Texas adopt the rule of 
law announced by the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, which all hold that the 
government may not use pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in its case-in-chief because the use of 
                                                             
15 Id. at 614.  
16 The Supreme Court has previously rejected certiorari in numerous cases presenting this very issue.  See United 
States v. Ashley, 664 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1651 (2012).  It is possible the Supreme 
Court did not take certiorari because Ashley was not viewed as the “perfect” case to decide the issue, due to the fact 
that no new information was provided by the admission of Ashley’s silence and the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it 
was harmless error.  Ashley, 664 F.3d at 605.  The circuit court explained: “We need not take any position regarding 
the split in order to resolve the case before us.  Even assuming arguendo that the government impermissibly used 
Ashley's pre-arrest, pre–Miranda silence, the error was harmless, because the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the error did not contribute to the verdict.”  Id. at 604.  See also United States v. Calise, 996 F.2d 1019 
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1078 (1994); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997 (1992); United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
1031 (1992); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1565 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989). 
17 See infra Part I-C-2.  
 4 
such silence violates a defendant’s right to remain silent.18  These holdings recognize that while 
Miranda warnings provide additional protection to defendants, they do not create and are not 
necessary to the existence of the right to remain silent.  Part I-A will explore the development of 
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, Part I-B will discuss the pioneer case of 
the debate, Miranda v. Arizona,
19
  Part I-C will discuss exceptions to Miranda, Part I-D-1 will 
address the relevant Supreme Court holdings on the issue of silence and Part I-D-2 will discuss 
the current circuit split regarding the use of a defendant’ pre-Miranda silence as substantive 
evidence in a prosecutor’s case-in-chief to prove a defendant’s guilt.  Part II will then argue that, 
in light of the Court’s tendency to exclude this evidence in factually similar cases, the Supreme 
Court should follow in the footsteps of the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Savory v. 
Lane
20
 by interpreting this silence according to the Griffin v. California precedent.
21
  Part III will 
conclude that it is unconstitutional to allow the use of a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence to be used against him at trial as substantive evidence of his guilt as it is contrary to the 
Fifth Amendment and will urge for a reversal of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision 
in Salinas v. Texas.   
I. Historical Background 
A. Fifth Amendment History  
One of the most fundamental rights incorporated into the Bill of Rights is the Fifth 
Amendment, which provides in relevant part that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any 
                                                             
18 Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991); Coppola 
v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir. 1989); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (1987).  
19 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
20 United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (1987) (relying upon Griffin to conclude that a 
defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence could not be used as direct evidence of guilt because the right to remain 
silent attaches before the adversarial proceedings even begin). 
21 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613–15 (1965) (holding that a defendant should not be penalized for 
exercising a constitutional privilege, and thus, a defendant’s choice not to testify at trial cannot be used against the 
defendant as evidence of guilt either by the prosecutor in closing argument or the court in jury instructions).  
 5 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”22  It is more than likely that most people in the 
United States have heard about Miranda v. Arizona, a case interpreting the Fifth Amendment that 
has since become embedded into American law, politics, and culture.
23
  Anyone who has seen a 
movie about crime, or watched police television dramas, knows that a defendant has the right to 
remain silent when arrested.
24
  Even if people are unaware that Miranda stems from the Fifth 
Amendment, they generally know that, if they are arrested and questioned by the police, they 
have the right to remain silent and to request a lawyer.
25
  This basic right is such a fundamental 
element of our justice system, so universally well known, that even children are indoctrinated 
into understanding its meaning at a young age.
26
   
To begin the discussion about the protections of the Fifth Amendment, it is helpful to 
look back to its inception.  English common law laid the foundation for the American right 
against self-incrimination.
27
  Dating back to thirteenth century England, Pope Innocent III 
                                                             
22 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
23 Laurie Magid, The Miranda Debate: Questions Past, Present, and Future A Review of the Miranda Debate: Law, 
Justice, and Policing, Edited by Richard A. Leo and George C. Thomas III, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1251, 1314 n. 6 
(1999) (“The Miranda decision is so well known that it has spawned an entire lexicon of new words and phrases: 
‘Miranda warnings,’ ‘Miranda rights, ‘Miranda waivers,’ ‘to Mirandize,’ and to ‘get Miranda’d.’”).  
24 See Joshua A. Engel, Frequent Fliers at the Court: The Supreme Court Begins to Take the Experience of Criminal 
Defendants into Account in Miranda Cases, 7 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 303, 340 n. 25 (2011) (citing United States 
v. Harris, 515 F.3d 1307, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“As every television viewer knows, an officer ordinarily may not 
interrogate a suspect who is in custody without informing her of her Miranda rights.”); United States v. DeNoyer, 
811 F.2d 436, 439 n.4 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that term “Miranda Warnings” “is commonly used, both in court and 
in television shows, to describe the ritual prescribed in Miranda v. Arizona”); United States v. Lacy, No. 2:09-CR-
45 TS, 2010 WL 1451344, at *2 (D. Utah, Apr. 8, 2010) (defendant testified “that he was very aware of his Miranda 
rights because of television”); Russell Dean Covey, Miranda and the Media: Tracing the Cultural Evolution of a 
Constitutional Revolution, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 761, 761 (2007) (“Not only did television make the Miranda warnings 
famous, its adoption of Miranda as an icon of criminal procedure may be main the reason Miranda is good law 
today.”)).  
25 Id. (citing THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING xv (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III 
eds., 1998) (reporting that 64.5% of parolees in one study demonstrated their knowledge of the Miranda warnings by 
correctly answering eleven or twelve out of twelve test questions)).  
26 See Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 
1000 (2001) (suggesting that schoolchildren are more familiar with the Miranda warnings than they are with 
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address).  
27 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2250, at 267–70 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed., 
1961). 
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authorized the use of an oath de veritate dicenda in the religious trials of the era.
28
  The oath 
required the defendant to swear that he would truthfully answer all questions, which was used to 
force self-incrimination.
29
  If the person did not swear the oath, he would be found guilty.  Yet if 
he answered and denied the charges, he was convicted of perjury.
30
   
Ironically, the absence of a right against self-incrimination in early English law’s served 
to enshrine it as a primary right in American jurisprudence.  In the seventeenth century, the Star 
Chamber Court of England used the de veritate dicenda oath to create the oath ex officio.
31
  The 
oath was a weapon, used as coercion, persecution and forcible self-incrimination.
32
  The oath 
was to be given by the accused prior to questioning by the Star Chamber, made to answer 
questions truthfully.
33
  But after John Lilburn was whipped in 1837 as a result of his famous 
refusal to participate in the Star Chamber Oath to face charges for heresy and sedition, the 
resulting public outcry led to the abolition of the oath.
34
  
As a response to these abuses, the common law right against self-incrimination evolved 
from the maxim, nemo tenetur seipsum prodere, which means “no man shall be compelled to 
criminate himself.”35  Also establishing the groundwork for the right was the theory that a 
defendant is always faced with a “cruel trilemma,” which prompted the need for protection.36  
Officers create the predicament of the “cruel trilemma” where a prisoner must choose between 
                                                             
28 Leonard Levy, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 431 (1968).  
29 Helen Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1346 (1959). 
30 Id.  
31 Mary A. Shein, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Seige: Asherman v. Meachum, 59 BROOK. L. 
REV. 503, 503 (1993) (noting history of state abuse behind drafting of privilege); LEVY, supra note 28, at 272–81.  
32 Id.  
33 8 WIGMORE, supra note 27.  
34 Jan Martin Rybnicek, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't?: The Absence of A Constitutional Protection 
Prohibiting the Admission of Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 405, 410 (2009) 
35 See John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71, 71 (1891). 
36 See Andrew J. M. Bentz, The Original Public Meaning of the Fifth Amendment and Pre-Miranda Silence, 98 VA. 
L. REV. 897, 899-900 (2012) (“The cruel trilemma is the decision a defendant would face if forced to choose 
between maintaining her silence and being held in contempt of court, or speaking and thereby either perjuring or 
incriminating herself.”); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
 7 




From this rich history, the American privilege against self-incrimination developed 
during the settlement of the nation’s thirteen colonies.38  The Founding Fathers of America 
appreciated the British common law right to remain silent that existed to protect the individual 
from the aggressive inquisitorial examinations by religious institutions.
39
  Before the privilege 
was incorporated into the Constitution by way of the Bill of Rights in 1791, it appeared in early 
versions America’s governing documents.40  From this, the Framers thus relied on this history of 
abuse, the common law privilege that they left behind in England, and their early governing 
documents when constructing the Fifth Amendment as it exists today, preserving one’s 
autonomy in prosecutions.
41
  The Supreme Court recognized the remarkable evolution of the 
right and commented in a late 19
th
 century case, Bram v. United States, that the “maxim, which 
in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability 
of a constitutional enactment.”42 
The Fifth Amendment evolved as a result of the Founder’s concern for the possibility of 
                                                             
37 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 671, 694-95 (1968) (discussing the cruel trilemma).  
38 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 446 (1956) (“The Framers . . . created the federally protected right of 
silence and decreed that the law could not be used to pry open one's lips and make him a witness against himself.  A 
long history and a deep sentiment lay behind this decision.  Some of those who came to these shores were Puritans 
who had known the hated oath ex officio used both by the Star Chamber and the High Commission.”). 
39 Andrew J.M. Bentz, Note, The Original Public Meaning of the Fifth Amendment and Pre-Miranda Silence, 98 
VA. L. REV. 897,  909 (2012) (citing A. ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO FRANCE 79-84 (John Simpson trans., 1914)).  
40 Congress ratified the Bill of Rights in 1791, including the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
See U.S. Const. amend. V.  Before that, a version of the right was included in Virginia’s Declaration of Rights in 
1776, which was drafted by George Mason three weeks before the Declaration of Independence.  James Madison 
used the Virginia Declaration of Rights as a model for drafting the Bill of Rights.  United States v. Hubbell, 530 
U.S. 27, 52 (2000).  
41 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 248 (1972) (explaining that the privilege was adopted by the drafters of the Bill of 
Rights “not only (as) an answer to numerous instances of colonial misrule but (as) a shield against ‘the evils that 
lurk(ed) in the shadows of a new and untried sovereignty.”).  
42 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532,  545 (1897).  
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an overwhelming and oppressive government and to protect the citizens of the fledgling nation.
43
 
The rights contained in the Fifth Amendment represent five distinct liberties that the Framers 
intended as safeguards from the abuses of authority they had left in England.
44
  With regard to 
the self-incrimination provision specifically, the Supreme Court has explained that two of the 
policy concerns underlying the privilege were a commitment to the adversarial system of justice 
and a desire to protect the innocent rather than punish the guilty.
45
  These are especially relevant 
to the Court’s determination in Salinas v. Texas, for in the pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence 
context, both of these values are implicated and jeopardized.
46
  
 In the early twentieth century leading up to Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court 
explored numerous cases regarding confessions obtained through the use of force and thereby set 
the standards for considering whether those confessions were given voluntarily without force or 
coercion.
47
  In Counselman v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court explained that a defendant has the 
privilege against testifying under oath and making incriminating statements against himself at 
trial.
48
  Such compelled confessions were a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-
incrimination.
49
  Five years later, the Supreme Court refined the voluntariness test by holding 
that involuntary confessions were inadmissible as evidence under the Fifth Amendment in Bram 
                                                             
43 Aktil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). 
44 See Ralph Rossum, “SELF-INCRIMINATION”: THE ORIGINAL INTENT, IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING 
AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 273, 278 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991).  These include: the right to be indicted 
by an impartial Grand Jury before being tried for a federal criminal offense, the right to be free from multiple 
prosecutions or punishments for a single criminal offense, the right to remain silent when prosecuted for a criminal 
offense, the right to have personal liberties protected by due process of law, and the right to receive just 
compensation when the government takes private property for public use.  
45 See Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (listing the purposes of the privilege). 
46 See Jane Elinor Notz, Prearrest Silence As Evidence of Guilt: What You Don't Say Shouldn't Be Used Against 
You, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1020 (1997) (“. . . Allowing prosecutorial use of such silence as evidence of guilt 
would favor the state in its competition against the individual. If a defendant knows that her prearrest silence may be 
used against her at trial, she is more likely to speak with the police earlier.  On [protecting the innocent], a defendant 
may remain silent not because she is guilty, but because she is shy, afraid, or inarticulate.”).  
47 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“The aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it 
was voluntarily made is to exclude false evidence. Tests are invoked to determine whether the inducement to speak 
was such that there is a fair risk the confession is false.”).  
48 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 




  There, the Court embraced the factor of “voluntariness” as the key to whether 
an admission violated Fifth Amendment due process.
51
  With the decision in Brown v. 
Mississippi, the trend of considering voluntariness continued.
52
  The Brown Court concluded that 
a defendant’s confession that was extracted by police violence through whippings and torture 
could not be entered as evidence as it violated the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the state 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
53
  Spano v. New York represented the 
movement of the Court’s jurisprudence away from the amorphous “voluntariness” standard, the 
former touchstone for determining whether police violated due process standards when eliciting 
confessions, towards the modern rule in Miranda v. Arizona.
54
  There, the Court focused less on 
extraneous factors such as meals provided to the accused, and more on whether the accused had 
access to legal counsel when judging the admissibility of confessions.
55
 
 While the 1964 case Escobedo v. Illinois introduced the right to counsel in the pre-
indictment stage as a limit on interrogation, it was also a step towards Miranda.
56
  Justice 
Goldberg, writing for the majority, held that the admission into evidence of statements made in 
the course of a custodial interrogation and after a suspect had requested but was denied counsel, 
was a violation of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, even if the suspect 
voluntarily made the statements.
57
  Relevant to the current analysis, the Court abandoned the 
traditional due process, voluntary-involuntary test for confessions and instead held that where a 
suspect is denied a lawyer and is not informed “of his absolute constitutional right to remain 
                                                             
50 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (“A confession can never be in evidence where prisoner has been 
influenced by any threat or promise, human minds under pressure.”).  
51 Id. at 542.  
52 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).  
53 Id. at 287.  
54 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
55 Id. at 324. 
56 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1968).  
57 Id. at 490–91. 
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silent,” it is a violation of the Sixth Amendment.58  Two short years later, the Supreme Court 
clarified whether the Fifth Amendment as well protected these rights in Miranda v. Arizona. 
B. Arriving at Miranda 
In 1966, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona,
59
 which 
dramatically changed the manner in which custodial interrogations took place in America.  
Miranda would soon become, by the Supreme Court’s own acknowledgement, one of the most 
well known criminal justice decisions in American jurisprudence.
60
  The Miranda Court held that 
the “Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the 
expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will 
not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a 
warning being given.”61  The Court emphasized that state legislatures could write laws that had 
different standards,
62
 but suggested that jurisdictions use the warning: “You have the right to 
remain silent.  Anything you say or do can and will be held against you in a court of law.  You 
have the right to an attorney.  If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you.”63  
When the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona in 1966, the Justices limited the 
holding to confessions obtained through abusive police tactics during custodial interrogation.
64
  
Two years prior, the Court’s holding in Escobedo v. Illinois had failed to address the issue of 
admissibility of improperly obtained confessions.
65
  The Miranda case was a consolidation of 
previous cases in which each defendant provided inculpatory statements to police offers while 
                                                             
58 Id. at 491.  
59 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
60 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) ( “Miranda has become embedded in routine police 
practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”). 
61 Id. at 468. 
62 Id. at 467. 
63 Id. at 479.  
64 Id.   
65 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1968).  
 11 
unaware of their constitutional rights to remain silent.
66
  The man who would become the 
namesake of the right, Ernesto Miranda, had been arrested and interrogated for two hours 
regarding a kidnapping and rape.
67
  After reciting a dense history of the Fifth Amendment and 
contemporary abuses of police power, the Court held that it was necessary to have a safeguard to 
prevent against compelled confessions.
68
  
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the majority and found that Ernesto Miranda had 
been subjected to questioning in a “police-dominated atmosphere . . . cut off from the outside 
world . . . without full warnings of [his] constitutional rights.”69  The Court ruled that “if a person 
in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal 
terms that he has the right to remain silent,”70 and a person in custody “must be clearly informed 
that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during 
interrogation.”71  The privilege is fulfilled only when the person is “guaranteed the right to 
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.”72  
Justice Harlan’s dissent, joined by Justices Stewart and White, firmly stated that Miranda 
was a poorly crafted decision by constitutional law standards and the severity of the mistake in 
constitutional law was incalculable.
73
  Justice Clark wrote a separate dissent, which 
recommended a “totality of the circumstances” approach, a standard where the state would have 
the burden to prove that, in light of all factors, the confession was clearly made voluntarily.
74
  
                                                             
66 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440 (“We dealt with certain phases of this problem recently in Escobedo v. Illinois . . . 
There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him 
in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to 
remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney.”). 
67 Id. at 491–92. 
68 Id. at 460–61. 
69 Id. at 445. 
70 Id. at 467–68.  
71 Id. at 471.   
72 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).  
73 Id. at 504 (Harlan J., dissenting). 
74 Id. at 501–03 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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Miranda mandated that statements made by criminal suspects in custody could not be 
used unless police officers first gave a warning to the suspect.
75
  These warnings, now 
colloquially known as “Miranda warnings,” were thought to be necessary to inform a defendant 
of his rights in the inherently coercive atmosphere during interrogation.
76
  A police officer is not 
required to inform a suspect of his Miranda rights until the police interrogation begins.
77
  A 
criminal defendant must be both in custody and subjected to interrogation for Miranda to 
apply.
78
  Yet the doctrine does require that a person in custody be advised that: 
[H]e has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a 
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot 
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so 
desires.”79   
 
Miranda announced that when a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation, his 
statements are inadmissible as substantive proof of his guilt unless he voluntarily and knowingly 
waives his rights after the police advise him of his rights.
80
  This ambition to fully inform 
suspects of their rights made Miranda the seminal Fifth Amendment decision it is because the 
Court stopped interpreting confessions under Due Process claims and instead shifted squarely 
into a Fifth Amendment analysis, where the very act of improper questioning of a suspect would 
be a constitutional violation, no matter if the confession was voluntary.
81
 
As ground breaking as Miranda was, almost immediately, it was met with heavy 
resistance by Congress
82
 and sparked tension with other Supreme Court Justices.
83
  At the time 
                                                             
75 Id. at 444. 
76 Id. at 444–45.   
77 Id. 
78 Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994).  
79 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.  
80 Id. at 468.  
81 David S. Romantz, “You Have the Right to Remain Silent”: A Case for the Use of Silence As Substantive Proof of 
the Criminal Defendant's Guilt, 38 IND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005). 
82 See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1968).  
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of the Court’s decision, no state had ever compelled adherence to any rule comparable to 
Miranda, as most states still applied a standard that analyzed the voluntariness of a defendant’s 
confession.
84
  As a result, most politicians and police officers condemned the Miranda decision 
as a judicially crafted vehicle to allow criminals avoid prosecution for their crimes.
85
   
Intent on superseding Miranda legislatively, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 two years after Miranda.
86
  Under Section 3501 of the Act, 
the statute made the admissibility of confessions turn on an analysis of voluntariness.
87
  
Government agents were therefore allowed to ignore Miranda’s admonition to read warnings to 
a defendant upon his arrest.
88
  The statute directed federal trial judges to admit statements of 
criminal defendants if they were made voluntarily, without any regard to whether the defendant 
had received his Miranda warnings.
89
  Voluntariness depended on such things as: the time 
between arrest and arraignment, whether the defendant knew the crime for which he had been 
arrested, whether he had been told that he did not have to talk to the police and that any 
statement could be used against him, whether the defendant knew prior to questioning that he 
had the right to the assistance of counsel, and whether he actually had the assistance of counsel 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
83 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 504 (Harlan J., dissenting); id. at 501–03 (Clark, J., dissenting); see Yale Kamisar, The Rise, 
Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965, 976 (2012) (“In his dissenting opinions and public 
speeches, Judge Burger had left no doubt that he was quite unhappy with the Warren Court's criminal procedure 
rulings–and equally unhappy with the liberal judges on his own court.”). 
84 Id. at 464–65 (majority opinion) (“The voluntariness doctrine in the state cases . . . indicates, encompasses all 
interrogation practices which are likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a 
free and rational choice.”).  
85 Russell Dean Covey, Miranda and the Media: Tracing the Cultural Evolution of A Constitutional Revolution, 10 
CHAP. L. REV. 761, 786 (2007) (“Beginning with President Nixon's election in 1968, however, the Miranda era gave 
way to a post-Miranda period characterized by an increasing backlash against the Warren Court agenda.  In the post-
Miranda world, Miranda was targeted by critics and reactionaries and became an icon of the law's perceived 
tenderness toward criminals.)” 
86 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (1968).  
87 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000) (discussing the history of the law governing the 
admissibility of confessions). 
88 Id. at 436 (“Given § 3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of 
any warning requirement, and the instruction for trial courts to consider a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the 
circumstances of a confession, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to 
overrule Miranda.”).  




  But, the “presence or absence of any of” these factors “need not be 
conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.”91  Because Section 3501 was an Act 
of Congress, it applied only to federal prosecutions and prosecutions in the District of Columbia, 
so individual states were still free to follow the Miranda approach instead.
92
 
The statute was nevertheless all but forgotten about in the following years.
93
  Although he 
signed the bill into law, President Lyndon B. Johnson was unhappy with the prospect of losing 
Miranda’s protections and directed the FBI to continue informing suspects of their rights.94  
Even Attorney General Ramsey Clark instructed prosecutors to only offer into evidence 
confessions obtained under Miranda’s guidelines.95  After President Richard Nixon was elected 
following a campaign heavily focused on combatting crime, his Attorney General, John Mitchell, 
directed federal prosecutors and agents to follow the Miranda rules, but to also use Section 3501 
to help obtain the admission of confessions.
96
  While the Department of Justice generally viewed 
Section 3501 as constitutional, the Department’s sporadic enforcement of it in the circuits over 
the years left the Courts free to use Miranda instead.
97
 
The constitutionality of the Act was not ruled upon until nearly 30 years later in 
Dickerson v. United States, where the Court confronted the fight over Miranda and chose the 
proper standard to apply to confessions.
98
  There, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to 
                                                             
90 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968)).  
91 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968). 
92 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 447; see 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a), (c).  
93 Michael Edmund O’Neill, Undoing Miranda, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 185, 234 (2000) (describing the history of the 
Act’s enforcement through the Presidencies of Johnson to Clinton). 
94 Id.  
95 Id. 
96 Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 
175, 199 (1999).  
97 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 465 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The United States’ repeated refusal 
to invoke § 3501, combined with the courts’ traditional (albeit merely prudential) refusal to consider arguments not 
raised, has caused the federal judiciary to confront a host of “Miranda ” issues that might be entirely irrelevant 
under federal law.”). 
98 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 447. 
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commit bank robbery and other offenses and the district court granted a motion to suppress the 
defendant’s statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation because he had not received his 
Miranda warnings, and the Fourth Circuit reversed because his statement was voluntary.
99
  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 7-2 majority, held that Miranda’s warnings-based approach to 
determining the admissibility of a statement made by accused during custodial interrogation was 
constitutionally based, and could not be overruled by a legislative act.
100
  In reaching this 
conclusion, Rehnquist hearkened back to the history before and after Miranda with a survey of 
the privilege against self-incrimination, dating back to English common law.
101
  Rehnquist 
concluded that Congress has the authority to pass statutes to protect the right against coercive 
self-incrimination, but warned that such legislation must be at least as effective in informing 
individuals of their rights as Miranda.
102
  
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, explaining in dissent that the “judgment 
convert[ed] Miranda from a milestone of judicial overreaching into the very Cheops’ Pyramid 
(or perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial arrogance.”103   Scalia believed 
that there was no support in history or precedent that a violation of the privilege against 
compelled-self incrimination would result from a violation of Miranda.
104
  Furthermore, he 
argued that the majority opinion never explicitly stated that Miranda was required by the 
constitution.
105
  Scalia also disagreed with the argument that Miranda should be preserved 
                                                             
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 437.  
101 Id. at 433.  
102 Id. 
103 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Miranda rights are not themselves rights protected by the 
Constitution.”).  
104 Id. at 451. 
105 Id. at 446 (“The Court need only go beyond its carefully couched iterations that “Miranda is a constitutional 
decision,” . . . that “Miranda is constitutionally based,” that Miranda has “constitutional underpinnings,” and come 
out and say quite clearly: “We reaffirm today that custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda warnings 
or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States.”  It cannot say that, because a majority of the Court 
does not believe it.”).  
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simply because the decision is well known.
106
  Hence, Scalia argued that the Supreme Court 




C. Exceptions to Miranda 
The Supreme Court’s shifting attitudes regarding the scope of the Fifth Amendment have 
led to a diverse range of case law, both analogous and distinctive, that the Court can reflect on 
guidance in Salinas v. Texas.  Even though Dickerson saved Miranda from being case aside in 
2000, the Supreme Court had already carved out numerous exceptions to Miranda’s 
requirements in string of precedent after Miranda.
108
  Three years after Omnibus Crime Control 
Act was first enacted, the Supreme Court created an exception where confessions taken in 
violation of Miranda could be used at trial for impeachment in Harris v. New York.
109
  The Court 
held that a statement which was inadmissible against the defendant in the prosecution’s case in 
chief because defendant had not been advised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent prior 
to making statement but which otherwise satisfied legal standards of trustworthiness was 
properly usable for impeachment purposes to attack credibility of defendant's trial testimony.
110
  
On its face, Harris cuts down Miranda’s power because police could potentially be incentivized 
to violate Miranda since any improper statement could nevertheless be admissible if the 
defendant testified. 
The rise and fall of Miranda continued in New York v. Quarles, where the Court held that 
Miranda warnings could be dispensed with all together if there was a concern for public safety 
                                                             
106 Id. at 464. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. (explaining that these Justices in Supreme Court history each played a prominent role in the downsizing and 
dismantling of Miranda: Chief Justice Burger with Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and Justice Rehnquist 
with in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)). 
109 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
110 Id. at 224–225.  
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that justifies immediate questioning.
111
  In that case, a woman who claimed she had just been 
raped said her attacker had just entered a supermarket with a gun.
112
  When the defendant was 
apprehended, the police handcuffed him and then asked him where the gun was before Miranda 
warnings were issued, to which he responded “the gun is over there.” 113  The Court created a 
narrow exception to Miranda and concluded that the need for answers to questions in situations 
posing a threat to pubic safety outweighed the need for Miranda warnings.
114
  Broadly construed, 
the two exceptions in Harris and Quarles could swallow up much of the Miranda rule.   
The Supreme Court further cut down the strength and influence of Miranda through a 




 and waiver of 
Miranda.
117
  In one such case, Oregon v. Mathiason, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue 
of whether a defendant’s inculpatory statements were admissible under Miranda when he 
voluntarily turned himself in at a police station, and when police had not yet Mirandized him and 
told him that he was not under arrest.
118
  The Court held that the statements made at the police 
station were admissible even though the defendant made them before police warned him of his 
constitutional rights, because while police did question the defendant in a police station, his 
freedom of movement was not curtailed in any significant way––he voluntarily went to the 
                                                             
111 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
112 Id. at 652.  
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 658.  
115 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984) (roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic 
stop is temporary and brief, therefore it does not constitute custodial interrogation for the purposes of the doctrine 
enunciated in Miranda). 
116 See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curium) (restating that Miranda applies only to custodial 
interrogation); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980) (holding that a defendant is not interrogated 
unless expressly questioned or the functionally equivalent, including “any words or actions on the part of the police 
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response”).  But see Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (holding that Missouri’s practice of 
interrogating suspects without reading them a Miranda warning, then reading them a Miranda warning and asking 
them to repeat their confession is unconstitutional.). 
117 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (holding that a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through 
the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver). 




  The Mathiason Court noted that while the police interview with the defendant might 
have been coercive, “a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies 
simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or 
restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a ‘coercive environment.”’120  
Thus, police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they 
question.
121
  Nor are warnings required simply when questioning takes place in a station house, 
or because the questioned person is a suspect.
122
  Rather, Miranda warnings are required only 
where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him in custody.123 
The Supreme Court further attempted to minimize the potential negative impact of 
Miranda exclusions on effective law enforcement with Oregon v. Elstad.
124
  There, the Court 
addressed Miranda in the context of confessions that were “fruits of the poisonous tree.”125  
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, explained that Miranda is a prophylactic device 
intended to protect the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, but errors in administering the 
warnings should not lead to the same consequences as infringement on the Fifth Amendment 
itself.
126
  The defendant in Elstad made several incriminating statements to police officers about 
                                                             
119 Id. at 495. 
120 Id. 
121 See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, at 324 (1994) (per curiam). (“Nor is the requirement of warnings to be 
imposed simply because ... the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.”).  
122 Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495; see Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984) (“The mere fact that an 
investigation has focused on a suspect does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in non-custodial settings, and 
the probation officer’s knowledge and intent have no bearing on the outcome of this case.”). 
123 Id. (“Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to 
render him ‘in custody.”).  
124 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (“If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the 
prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement 
of the Fifth Amendment itself.”).  
125 Id. “Fruits of the poisonous tree” is an expression representing evidence obtained illegally that is usually applied 
as an exclusionary rule in the context of searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.  Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).  
126 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309.  
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a burglary after he was taken into custody, but prior to being read his Miranda rights.
127
  When  
his rights were eventually read to him, however, he waived them, providing statements that the 
government then used against him at trial.
128
  Justice O’Connor explained that it did not matter 
whether the police failed to give Miranda warnings before the defendant’s first confession, so 
long as the eventual confession was not coerced.
129
  It is important to note that even though the 
defendant’s subsequent, post-Miranda waiver statements were admissible, the Court held that the 
unwarned original admission must be suppressed.
130
  
D. The Use of Silence 
1. Supreme Court Precedent  
The current discord among the circuit courts primarily stems from the differing 
interpretations of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incriminating statements.  The 
jurisdictions that that have ruled on the admission of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as evidence 
of guilt usually do so by employing an extension or curtailment of Supreme Court precedent 
from Griffin v. California,
131
 Doyle v. Ohio,
132
 Fletcher v. Weir,
133
 and Jenkins v. Anderson.
134 
Jenkins and Fletcher represent the law of pre-Miranda silence as it relates to impeachment only.  
Doyle and Wainright addressed post-Miranda silence as it relates to both impeachment and 
evidence of guilt.
135
  In these prior decisions, the question of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence has 
                                                             
127 Id. at 298.  
128 Id. at 318.  
129 Id.  
130 Id.  
131 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that a prosecutor’s reference in closing argument to 
defendant's exercising his right to refuse to testify, and instruction allowing jury to consider it, violated the right 
against self-incrimination).  
132 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (holding that a defendant’s silence in response to a Miranda warning cannot 
be used against him).  
133 Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (holding that post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence can be used to impeach 
a testifying defendant). 
134 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (holding that the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of pre-
arrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant’s credibility).  
135 See supra notes 189–191 and accompanying text. 
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evaded review.  Salinas v. Texas raises this issue squarely and thrusts into the current and 
uncertain state of pre-Miranda jurisprudence.  
The Federal Rules of Evidence distinguish between the use of silence for impeachment 
and as substantive evidence.
136
  Impeachment is justified on the ground that when a defendant 
chooses to testify, he waives his privilege against self-incrimination.
137
  Under the Rules of 
Evidence, if a defendant testifies to a statement that is inconsistent with one he made earlier, his 
credibility can be impeached by the introduction of his prior inconsistent statement.
138
  If the 
defendant’s prior statement was made under oath or at a prior hearing or deposition, the 
statement can be admitted as substantive evidence.
139
   
a. Silence at Trial 
Over the last half a century, the Supreme Court has been prolific in the area of law 
regarding silence in various criminal prosecutions.  The Court has ruled on the use of post-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence used for both impeachment and substantive evidence.
140
  The most 
promising case for Genovevo Salinas, Griffin v. California, involved a prosecutor who expressly 
asked the jury to draw a negative inference from the defendant’s choice not to take the witnesses 
stand.
141
  The defendant was charged with murdering a friend who he had been with the night 
before.
142
  The prosecutor remarked that the jury should consider the evidence that the defendant 
did not try to disclaim the prosecution’s theory as evidence of guilt in light of the fact that he 
would have been the last person to see the decedent alive and would be in the best position to 
                                                             
136 If the prior inconsistent statement of an available witness is used as substantive evidence, the prior statement 
must have been made under oath and at a prior hearing or deposition.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).  Yet if the prior 
statement is offered only to impeach the defendant’s credibility, the requirements for the oath and hearing are not 
necessary.  FED. R. EVID.  613. 
137 See Notz, supra note 46, at 1023.  
138 FED. R. EVID. 613.  
139 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).  
140 See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).  
141 Griffin v. California, 380 US 609 (1965).  
142 Id. 
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explain how the night ended, if he were innocent.
143
  The Court applied this right even before the 
defendant’s arrest, reasoning that Miranda warnings are additional protections, but are not 
necessary to the existence of the right against self-incrimination.
144
  The Court ultimately found 
that the trial court had violated the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment and 
reversed his conviction.
145
  The Court did not address the government’s use of a defendant’s 
silence at his arrest for impeachment but it did, however, create a bright line rule that a 
defendant’s silence as a result of his refusal to testify could not be submitted as evidence against 
him because it violated the Fifth Amendment.
146
 
The Supreme Court later applied Doyle to determine that the government’s use of a 
defendant’s post-arrest and post-Miranda silence as substantive evidence to contradict his 
insanity plea violated due process.
147
  David Greenfield was arrested for sexual battery and he 
was read his rights on three separate occasions before he even reached the police station.
148
  He 
stated that he understood his rights and asked for an attorney.
149
  At trial, the defendant pled not 
guilty by reason of insanity.
150
  The prosecutors, in part by questioning the officers about the 
defendant’s demeanor during questioning, and through closing argument, told the jury that the 
defendant’s silence proved he was sane enough to understand his rights and to exercise them.151  
The defendant was sentenced to life in prison.
152
  The Supreme Court held that the government 
violated the defendant’s due process rights when the prosecutor used the defendant’s post-arrest, 
                                                             
143 Id. at 610–11.  
144 Id. at 614.  
145 Id.  
146 Id. at 614–15. 
147 Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986). 
148 Id. at 286.  
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 287.  
151 Id.  
152 Id. at 286–87. 
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post-Miranda silence for either impeachment or case-in-chief purposes.
153
  Specifically, the 
Court stated that the Miranda warnings include an implicit promise that a defendant’s silence 
will not be used against him and thus could not be used to contradict the defendant’s sanity.154 
b. Silence Arising After Both an Arrest and the Receipt of a Miranda 
Warning, for Impeachment and Substantive Evidence 
 
Ten years after Miranda, the Supreme Court addressed a case with comparable facts to 
Salinas, where the issue arose whether a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence could be 
used for impeachment purposes if the defendant testified at trial.
155
  In Doyle v. Ohio, the 
defendants were charged with selling marijuana to an undercover informant.
156
  At trial, the 
defendants testified that the informant framed them and the prosecution impeached them on 
cross-examination by questioning why they failed to tell their exculpatory story after they had 
been arrested and given Miranda warnings.
157
  The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, 
announced that that such use was impermissible, explaining that prosecutors are not allowed to 
comment on a defendant’s silence to impeach any testimony he may give at trial if the silence 
arose after officers had read him his Miranda rights.
158
  The Court explained that the silence 
could not be used even for impeachment purposes because, “while . . . the Miranda warnings 
contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any 
person who receives the warnings.” 159   It would therefore be “fundamentally unfair and a 
deprivation of due process” to allow the use of the warned arrestee's silence to be used even for 
                                                             
153 Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 295. 
154 Id.  
155 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
156 Id. at 611.  
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 618. 
159 Id. (“Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda 
rights).  
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impeaching an explanation first offered at trial.
160
  Furthermore, the Court cautioned that the 
silence after Miranda is inherently ambiguous because it may just be due to the Miranda 
warning’s admonition itself.161 The Court prohibited the use of post-Miranda silence to impeach 
a defendant as it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
162
   
In Doyle v. Ohio, the Court announced an exception to an exception to the general rule 
that a defendant’s silence cannot be used for any purpose, and prohibited impeachment with a 
defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence.163  However, the Court evaluated this case under 
due process grounds, and not Fifth Amendment.  But relevant to the analysis here is the Court’s 
belief that, even though the defendant was not compelled in anyway to speak or stay silent, his 
decision to remain silent was induced by Miranda warnings.  This could also apply to a 
defendant who has not been arrested but is unresponsive during police contact because anything 
he might say would be incriminating.    
c. Silence Arising Prior to Arrest and Receipt of a Miranda warning  
In 1980, the Supreme Court cautiously approached the issue of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence, but deliberately left the question unanswered.  The Jenkins v. Anderson decision 
addressed the issue of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence only for impeachment purposes.
164
  There, 
the Court allowed the prosecution to use pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to impeach a 
defendant’s credibility when he testifies at trial.165  The defendant in Jenkins stabbed a man to 
death and fled the scene of the crime, only to be apprehended two weeks later.
166
  At trial, the 
                                                             
160 Id. 
161 Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.  
162 Id. at 618.  
163 Id. at 617.   
164 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240–41 (1980).  
165 Id. at 231.   
166 Id. at 232.   
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defendant asserted that he acted in self-defense.
167
  The prosecutor then questioned the defendant 
as to why he did not explain to the arresting officers that he acted in self-defense.
168
  The 
prosecution subsequently used this silence in summation to argue that the defendant would have 
immediately reported this claim of self-defense when authorities approached him if he had, in 
fact, acted in self-defense.
169
  The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether the prosecutor’s commentary on his silence was 
a violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment. 170   The ruling in Jenkins was limited to 
impeachment use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.
171
  The Jenkins holding in some ways can 
be characterized as incomplete, as it does not address the Fifth Amendment rights of a defendant 
who never takes the stand, and whether this pre-arrest silence is privileged in any situation. 
First, the Court in Jenkins stated that the rule outlined in Griffin that a prosecutor could 
comment on a defendant exercising his right to remain silent at trial did not apply because, 
Jenkins voluntarily chose to testify in his own defense.
172
  Under a constitutional analysis, the 
Court found that the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, did not protect the defendant in that case because impeachment with pre-arrest 
silence “follow[ed] the defendant's own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advance[d] 
the truth-finding function of the criminal trial.”173  Moreover, the Court said that, because the 
police had not read the defendant his Miranda rights, Doyle’s estoppel theory, 174  did not 
                                                             
167 Id. at 233.  
168 Id. at 234. 
169 Id. at 235.  
170 Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238. 
171 Id. at 241.  
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  The Court held that the defendant's pre-arrest silence could be used against him for 
impeachment purposes, as no governmental action induced the defendant to remain silent before 
his arrest, but made clear that state courts were free to outlaw the practice through their own 
Rules of Evidence.
176
  The Court reached its ruling since a defendant who takes the stand makes 
a decision “to cast aside his cloak of silence and advance the truth-finding function of the 
criminal trial.”177  The Court also held that the use of the silence to impeach his credibility did 
not deny him fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
178
  Neither the 
Doyle nor Jenkins decisions, however, decided the issue of whether pre-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence is admissible where the defendant does not testify, and cast aside his “cloak of silence.” 
d. Silence Arising After an Arrest But Before the Receipt of a Miranda Warning 
 
In a case with substantially similar facts to Jenkins, the Fletcher Court held that the 
impeachment use of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence did not violate due process.179  
In Fletcher v. Weir, the Court was faced with the question of whether the Fifth Amendment 
precluded the use of such silence for impeachment during cross-examination about post-arrest 
silence when a defendant willingly takes the stand.
180
  At trial for murder charges stemming from 
a stabbing, Fletcher took the stand in his own defense and claimed he acted in self-defense.
181
  
Similar to the defendant in Jenkins, Fletcher fled the scene of the crime and only offered his 
exculpatory story for the first time on the stand.
182
  But unlike the defendant in Jenkins, here the 
                                                             
175 Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240. 
176 Id. at 240–41 (“Our decision today does not force any state court to allow impeachment through the use of pre-
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defendant was silent prior to receiving his Miranda warnings, but after he was arrested.
183
  The 
prosecution, on cross-examination, inquired why he never offered the explanation before.
184
  The 
defense argued that the arrest triggered the defendant’s right to remain silent, and therefore the 
prosecutor’s questioning of the defendant’s ulterior motive for silence violated his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
185
  The Court did not agree and plainly stated that 
courts that had been improperly extending Doyle beyond its scope to protect a defendant’s 
silence during the period immediately after his arrest but before Miranda warnings were 
issued.
186
  The Court concluded that in the absence of the affirmative assurances embodied in 
Miranda, it is not improper for the state to permit the cross-examination.
187
  
2. Circuit Split Regarding the Evidentiary Use of Pre-Arrest, Pre-Miranda 
Silence 
 
Although the Miranda decision established that a defendant has the right to remain silent, 
it has not provided any more definitive guidance on the current subject.  Despite the proliferation 
of Supreme Court cases about the use of a defendant’s silence at trial, the courts are split on the 
constitutionality of admitting pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt.   
Additionally, stemming from the deep confusion over the limits of the Fifth Amendment 
and the reach of Miranda protection in the federal courts, the circuit courts are split on whether 
the government can use post-arrest silence in its case in chief, where the defendant has not been 
given Miranda warnings.
188
  Because the Supreme Court would likely need to address these 
                                                             
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 603–04. 
185 Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605. 
186 Id. at 606. 
187 Id. at 607.  
188 The First, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have each held that post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence 
is inadmissible at trial as evidence of guilt.  These Circuits emphasize that the Fifth Amendment right is inherent and 
does not need to be triggered by the issuance of the Miranda warning to have effect.  United States v. Velarde-
Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001) (the use of “pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt does not 
violate the privilege against self-incrimination”); see also United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385–90 (D.C. Cir. 
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distinct issues separately, this Comment will only address the split regarding pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence. 
Turning to the topic of this Comment, four courts of appeals allow the use of pre-arrest, 
pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt.
189
  The Ninth and D.C. Circuits only allow 
the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.
190
  Alternatively, the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth 
Circuits prohibit the prosecution from using any pre-Miranda silence as evidence of guilt.
191
   
The circuits that prohibit this evidence rely primarily on the theory enunciated in Griffin v. 
California, namely that commenting on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the “inquisitorial 
system of criminal justice,” which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.192  The Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit has also indicated that pre-Miranda silence is likely not admissible.
193
  These 
cases generally hinge on whether the prosecution introduces the defendant’s silence solely for 
impeachment purposes or as substantive evidence of guilt.  
 In Coppola v. Powell, the First Circuit reached the conclusion that a defendant’s pre-
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
1997); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1564 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 322–23 
(7th Cir. 1991).  The Third Circuit has addressed post-arrest silence but has held that any Due Process violation that 
may have existed from the use of silence at trial was harmless.  See Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (explaining that the trial record was unhelpful in determining the propriety of the cross-examination of 
defendant but that any violation as to his post-arrest silence was harmless). 
189 See United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 
1985).  
190 See United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 
377 (1997).  
191 United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200–01 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997 (1992) (holding 
that the admission into evidence of the agents’ testimony concerning Burson’s silence was plain error); United 
States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 1987) (the right to remain silent is a constitutional 
right to say nothing about the allegations against oneself, and though Miranda warnings can provide additional 
protection, they are not necessary to the existence of the right); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that Fifth Amendment applies in pre-arrest setting and “that the use of a defendant’s pre-arrest silence as 
substantive evidence of guilt violates the . . . privilege against Self Incrimination”);  Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 
1562, 1568 (holding that it was not harmless error for the prosecutor to comment on defendant’s refusal to confess 
or answer questions without a lawyer present, as he was relying on his Fifth Amendment guarantee). 
192 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615(1965).  
193 See United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that it was “not confident that [Jenkins v. 
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980),] permits even evidence that a suspect remained silent before he was arrested or 
taken into custody to be used in the Government’s case in chief”).  
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arrest, pre-Miranda silence should not be used as substantive evidence of guilt, and the court’s 
reasoning is representative of the line of cases that precede and succeed it.
194
  In this case, the 
police went to the defendant’s home in an attempt to investigate a recent rape.195  Before he was 
arrested or Mirandized, the defendant stated, “I grew up on the streets of Providence, Rhode 
Island.  And if you think I'm going confess to you, you're crazy.”196  At trial, the prosecution 
introduced this statement in a ploy to have the jurors infer that an innocent person would not 
object to speaking to police to clear his name.
197
  The petitioner was convicted and, on appeal, 
the First Circuit found that the district court erred in admitting the silence.
198
  The court held that 
the petitioner’s statement was a clear invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to silence and 
therefore the admission was in violation of his right against self-incrimination and that the error 
was not “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”199  
In United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, the defendant refused to talk in a non-custodial 
setting about murders with which he was later charged, which was used against him at trial.
200
 
The Illinois Appellate Court found such use to be inappropriate on appeal, but nonetheless 
deemed the error as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
201
  The Seventh Circuit
202
 held that the 
right to remain silent is a constitutional right to say nothing about the allegations against oneself, 
and though Miranda warnings can provide additional protection, they are not necessary to the 
existence of the right.
203
  The court specifically drew comparison to Griffin, even though the 
                                                             
194 Coppola, 878 F.2d at 1568. 
195 Id. at 1563. 
196 Id.  
197 Id. at 1568. 
198 Id.  
199 Id.  
200 United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 1987). 
201 Id. at 1016.  
202 Id. at 1012. The defendant first filed a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois.  
203 Id. at 1018.  
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silence in that case happened at trial and was not the product of out of court questioning, and 
found that the right applied equally to the defendant’s silence before trial and arrest.204   
In United States v. Hernandez, the defendant objected to the prosecution’s use of his 
post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in the case against him.
205
  The trial court admitted the evidence 
of the silence.
206
  Relying on Savory v. Lane, the Seventh Circuit determined that the government 
could not use a defendant's pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt in its case-in-
chief.
207
  The court concluded, however, that the admission of testimony concerning the 
defendant’s post-arrest silence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.208 
The Tenth Circuit similarly does not allow the prosecution to comment on a defendant’s 
pre-arrest silence.
209
  In United States v. Burson, I.R.S. agents testified at trial about the 
defendant’s refusal to answer questions about his finances prior to his arrest for tax evasion.210 
The court relied on the legal principle announced in Griffin, using the rule to prevent the 
prosecution from commenting on any Fifth Amendment right the defendant had chosen to 
exercise.
211
  The court interpreted the Griffin precedent to mean that any comment on silence 
during trial is inappropriate, even though the exact language of Griffin is limited to prohibiting 
commentary on a defendant’s failure to take the stand and testify in in his own defense.212 




 Circuits have found that admitting a 
defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence for use in the prosecution’s case-in-chief is not a 
                                                             
204 Id. at 1017.  
205 United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 322 (7th Cir. 1991).  
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 322–23. 
208 Id. at 324.  
209 United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991). 
210 Id. at 1203. 
211 Id. at 1201. 
212 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
213 United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666, 678 (4th Cir. 2004). 
214 United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Carter, 760 F.2d 1568, 1577 
(11th Cir. 1985). 
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constitutional violation.  While not going as far, the Third Circuit
215
 indicated it would agree 
with these sister circuits and would permit the government to use such silence as substantive 
evidence of guilt if the issue presented itself in the future.  These courts reason that the 
protections against self-incrimination do not apply before a suspect is arrested and has been 
given Miranda warnings because there is no official compulsion to speak and the Fifth 
Amendment does not protect in such a situation.
216
  
These circuits cumulatively held that, because the government had not yet implicitly 
assured the defendant that his silence would not be used against him, it was admissible since 
Miranda was not required at that point.
217
  Notwithstanding the fact that Miranda’s purpose was 
to restore the balance of power between a suspect and police in custodial interrogations by 
informing defendants of their rights, judges with particularly strong views on individual rights 




The Eleventh Circuit similarly holds that the prosecution does not violate the Fifth  
                                                             
215 While the Third Circuit has not addressed the exact issue, one district court in the Third Circuit has suggested 
that pre-Miranda silence may be admissible.  See Whitney v. Horn, No. 99-1993, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87910, at 
*38 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2008) (saying there is no protection for “a defendant from references to his pre-Miranda 
silence immediately following his arrest”).  
216 See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 241 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination is simply irrelevant to a citizen’s decision to remain silent when he is under no official 
compulsion to speak.”). 
217 See United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 & n.12 (11th Cir. 1991) (the defendant wanted the Judge to 
declare a mistrial when the government commented on her silence; United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052 (1985) 
(where three defendants sought a mistrial from their drug conspiracy conviction when the district court admitted 
testimony of a law enforcement agent concerning the defendants’ silence at the drug drop-off site on the night of 
their arrest).  The court held that “even if she was in custody at that time, the government could comment on her 
silence as she viewed the officer’s inspection of a suitcase obtained from her because she had not yet been given her 
Miranda warnings).  Both Love and Rivera depended on the Supreme Court’s decision in Fletcher v. Weir.  Yet, 
these Circuits diverge on whether there is a constitutional difference between using silence as evidence of guilt and 
using the same silence to impeach a testifying defendant.  
218 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 492 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 
444 (1974) (“The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution 
but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.’”).  
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Amendment by commenting on a defendant’s pre-arrest silence. 219   Three defendants were 
arrested for a multitude of drug offenses upon entering Miami from a trip to Colombia after a 
customs agent found cocaine in their suitcases.
220
  While the customs agent discovered the 
cocaine hidden in the false bottom of the suitcases and in false aerosol hairspray cans, the 
defendants, one of whom plead guilty prior to trial, showed no surprise or reaction at all during 
the encounter, and explicitly testified that nothing was said during the search and that one of the 
defendants had a “dead pan” reaction, expressionless demeanor.221  Government counsel used the 
two defendants’ pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to insinuate that they were guilty and that they 
made a prior agreement made to stay quiet if their plan was foiled.
222





 the court immediately dismissed the argument that silence either before or after 
arrest but prior to Miranda warnings was improper.
225
  The Eleventh Circuit took the position 
that Miranda warnings were necessary to trigger the protections of the Fifth Amendment.
226
  
In United States v. Zanabria,
227
 the Fifth Circuit allowed the prosecution to comment on 
a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.
228
  The prosecution presented a customs agent that 
testified that the defendant never mentioned an exculpatory story prior to trial where his wife 
                                                             
219 United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1991). 
220 Id. at 1565–66.  
221 Id. at 1565. 
222 Id. at 1568.  
223 See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235 (1980) (allowing the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence for 
impeachment purposes if the defendant takes the stand in his own defense).   
224 See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 609 (1982) (holding that post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is permissible to 
impeach a defendant on cross-examination who takes the stand in his own defense).  
225 Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1567–68 (citing Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 231; Fletcher, 445 U.S. at 603 (“We note initially that 
some of Inspector Schor’s testimony, even if construed as comments on Vila’s silence, do not raise constitutional 
difficulties.  The government may comment on a defendant’s silence if it occurred prior to the time that he is 
arrested and given his Miranda warnings . . . In addition, the government may comment on a defendant’s silence 
when it occurs after arrest, but before Miranda warnings are given.”)).  
226 Id. at 1568.  
227 United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996).  
228 But see United States v. Ashley, 664 F.3d 602, 604 n.6 (5th Cir. 2011) (“This court has taken the position that the 
prosecution can use a non-testifying defendant’s pre-arrest silence as long as the silence is not induced by, or a 
response to, the actions of a government agent.  Other circuits have interpreted Zanabria as our fully endorsing use 
of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, but the issue is unresolved until this court is faced with a case in which silence is 
induced by, or is a response to, government action.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted)).  
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testified in his defense.
229
  Post-Zanabria cases
230
 have also held that “a prosecutor's reference to 
a non-testifying defendant's pre-arrest silence does not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination if the defendant's silence is not induced by, or a response to, the actions of the 
government.”231  
Notwithstanding these circuits that do not find a constitutional violation, the Supreme 
Court’s silence precedence discussed in Part I-D-1 suggests that pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence 
is inadmissible and contrary to the intent of the Fifth Amendment, and as, such should be 
excluded from comment by prosecutors or other introductions as evidence of guilt.  The 
reasoning of United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane should influence the Supreme Court’s ultimate 
decision in Salinas, as the Seventh Circuit there correctly excluded such evidence.
232
  In that 
case, the court recognized that since that the defendant relied on his right to remain silent, 
Illinois’ argument that the use of his silence to imply guilt did not present a constitutional issue 
was “nothing short of incredible, given the language of our Constitution and the interpretation it 
has been consistently given.”233  The Court swiftly rejected the applicability of the Jenkins and 
Fletcher as well, as those cases dealt with silence used for impeachment only.
234
   
3. State Courts 
State courts have not reached consistent results on the admissibility of such silence.  
Although the majority of courts to face the issue have ruled that the prosecution may not 
                                                             
229 Zanabria, 74 F.3d at 593.  
230 Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 282–83 (6th Cir. 2000) cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035 (2000) (the use of defendant’s 
pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).  
231 United States v. Elashyi, 554 F.3d 480, 506 (5th Cir. 2008); see United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 487 (2007). 
232 United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 1987). 
233 Id.  
234 Id.  
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introduce pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence during its case-in-chief,
235
 these courts usually discuss 
the implications of such silence under their own state constitutions and rules of evidence.  Some 
Courts find that this silence does not implicate the Fifth Amendment.
236
  Therefore, the state 
court split is not addressed here as it is outside the scope of this Comment.
237
 .  
4. Salinas v. Texas in the Supreme Court 
Thirty-three years ago, the Supreme Court explicitly stated in Jenkins v. Anderson that it 
was declining to address whether the use of a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence would 
violate the Fifth Amendment.
238
  In 2013, the Supreme Court finally granted certification in 
Salinas v. Texas, deciding to rule on the circuit split regarding this very issue.
239
  The defendant-
subject of the case is Genovevo Salinas, a man who was questioned about the murder of two 
brothers in 1992.
240
  Salinas cooperated with police and answered questions for almost an hour, 
but looked down at the floor and stayed silent instead of answering a question as to whether a 
                                                             
235 The states that exclude pre-Miranda silence do so because their state constitutions require it.  See, e.g., Nelson v. 
State, 691 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (“We, therefore, conclude that under Article 1, § 9 of the Alaska 
Constitution, a person who is under arrest for a crime cannot normally be impeached by the fact that he was silent 
following his arrest.”); People v. Jacobs, 204 Cal. Rptr. 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“We hold that under the 
circumstances of this case questioning appellant on cross-examination about his silence occurring both during and 
following his arrest violated appellant’s privilege against self-incrimination under California Constitution, article I, 
section 15.”); Lee v. State, 422 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he right to remain silent is entitled to 
greater protection in our state than that required by the United States Supreme Court.”);  Key-El v. State, 709 A.2d 
1305, 1311 (Md. 1998) (holding pre-arrest silence admissible under Fifth Amendment); State v. Davis, 686 P.2d 
1143, 1146 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (“There is no logic in protecting a defendant advised of his rights and not an 
unadvised defendant.  Both defendants are exercising the same constitutional right.”).  Other state courts have 
excluded silence evidence under the Fifth Amendment.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 A.2d 537, 539 (Pa. 
1982) (“[W]e do not think it sufficiently probative of an inconsistency with [a defendant’s] in-court testimony to 
warrant allowance of any reference at trial to the silence.”); State v. Graves, 27 S.W.3d 806, 811–12 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2000) (admission of evidence was harmless); People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605, 609–10 (Colo. 1983) (evidence was 
not relevant under state evidentiary rule).  
236 State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517 (1986); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1996); State v. Helgeson, 303 
N.W.2d 342 (N.D. 1981). 
237 See Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 138 (2001) (reviewing state court cases decided on state 
constitutional grounds); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ashley v. United States, 11-931, 2012 WL 249648, at *17 
(2012).   
238 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236 n.2 (1980) (explaining in dicta that “Our decision today does not 
consider whether or under what circumstances pre-arrest silence may be protected by the Fifth Amendment”) 
239 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013).  
240 Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2013) 
(No. 12–246.) 
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shotgun recovered from his home would match shells found at the crime scene.
241
  He was later 
charged with murder after a witness told the police Salinas had confessed to murdering the 
victims.
242
  After managing to evade arrest for over 15 years, he was captured in 2007 eventually 
tried for murder.
243
  In an extremely brief opinion, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
acknowledged that neither it nor the Supreme Court had decided the issue at bar.
244
  When 
deciding the case, the lower Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston 
245
 relied on Justice Stevens’ 
concurrence in Jenkins, and on appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with that 
approach.
246
  In Jenkins, Justice Stevens explained that the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination is irrelevant to a citizen’s decision to remain silent even when he is under no 
official compulsion to speak.
247
  The Salinas court used that argument undermine the reasoning 
of the Fifth Amendment by concluding that the pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was not protected 
by the Fifth Amendment because it was not compelled.
248
  
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Salinas v. Texas on April 17, 2013.
249
  The 
Petitioner’s argument relied on a broad interpretation of the rule announced in Griffin v. 
California that prevents the government from arguing that a defendant’s guilt may be surmised 
by his silence because an innocent person would deny law enforcement’s accusations.  Similarly, 
in footnote 37 in Miranda, the Supreme Court said that if a suspect in custody invokes his right 
                                                             
241 Id.  
242 Id.  
243 Id.  Salinas’ first trial resulted in a deadlocked jury, but he was later convicted and sentenced to 20 years at a 
retrial in 2011.   
244 Id. at 178. 
245 Salinas v. State, 368 S.W.3d 550, 557 (Tex. App. 2011).  
246 Salinas, 369 S.W.3d at 179.  
247 Id. at 179 n.12 & 17 (citing Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“We recognize that the facts of 
Jenkins differ from the instant case.  We nonetheless find the reasoning in Justice Stevens’ concurrence to be 
relevant and persuasive.”)).  
248 Id.  
249 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013) (No. 12-246). 
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to remain silent, that fact may not be used as evidence against him.
250
  The petitioner urged that 
because Americans know they have a right to remain silent, to allow the government to make 
insinuations based on silence in a non-custodial setting merely creates a trap for the unwary that 
do not know that the police will use their silence as evidence of guilt.
251
   
Alternatively, the Respondent’s case rested on a narrow interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment based on the facts of the case.  Respondent requested a ruling where, absent an 
unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent, a defendant’s failure to answer a question 
during a noncustodial, voluntary interview should not be protected by the Fifth Amendment, for 
it reveals the defendant’s guilty conscience.252  The Respondent also offered that silence used in 
a noncustodial setting is voluntary in the sense that the defendant can say he does not want to 
answer anymore questions.  This would be enough to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination,
253
 but silence alone might have many explanations, including that the suspect 
could be contemplating an exculpatory story in his head, or is expressing momentary shock that 
the police know more information and have evidence than the suspect initially thought.
254
    
The Justices expressed considerable skepticism to both arguments.
255
  Worried about the 
prosecutor using such silence, Justice Sotomayor stated that silence as an admission of guilt is 
“such a radical position.”256  The Justice stated “it’s a little scary to me that an unanswered 
question is evidence of guilt.”  On the other hand, Justice Scalia posed that mere silence would 
indicate that the suspect did not want to speak so the evidence would not be probative.  The 
                                                             
250 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1968) (“The prosecution may not . . . use at trial the fact that [the 
defendant] stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.”).  
251 Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013) (No. 12-246).  
252 Id. at 30. 
253 Id. at 48.   
254 Id. 
255 Editorial, The Right to Remain Silent, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/opinion/sunday/the-right-to-remain-silent.html?_r=0 (“ 
256 Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013) (No. 12-246).  
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Respondent countered that silence could indicate that the suspect is having difficulty crafting an 
exculpatory response and that he is worried about the questions.
257
 
Much of the argument also focused on whether the protection against self-incrimination 
requires an affirmative invocation of the right to remain silent in this context.
258
  To require an 
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination mistakenly assumes that this provision of 
the Fifth Amendment is procedurally analogous to other non-self-executing rights.  For example, 
a defendant who wishes to have counsel present during custodial interrogation must ask for 
counsel and the officers must have a lawyer be brought to the stationhouse to satisfy the Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel during questioning.
259
  Similarly, the Sixth Amendment provides 
the right to “assistance of counsel” before trial.260  A defendant must ask for a lawyer if he 
desires one, although the right to counsel will default to the appointment of one by the court if 
the defendant does not request one.
261
  Securing counsel thus involves the actions of other 
people.  Similarly, a defendant has the right to a trial by jury for a felony under the Sixth 
Amendment.
262
  But if the defendant wishes to waive this right, he must do so in writing with the 
court’s approval and government consent.263  A defendant who seeks pre-trial release has the 
right to prove that he should be granted bail.
264
  A defendant also has the right to ask the court 
                                                             
257 Id. at 34.  
258 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013) (No. 12-246). 
259 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that after defendant invoked his right to have counsel present 
during custodial interrogation, he had not waived his right by showing only that he responded to police-initiated 
interrogation after being again advised of his rights).  
260 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (finding the right to assistance of 
counsel to be fundamental).   
261 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (holding that once criminal proceedings have begun, the 
defendant has the right to have a lawyer present during questioning and the government cannot bypass the lawyer 
and try to elicit statements from the defendant); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 (1962) (requiring the 
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants charged with state crime). 
262 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that the fundamental right 
applies to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
263 FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(e). 
264 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting excessive bail set in pre-trial detention); but see Bail Reform Act, codified 
at 18 U.S.C § 3141–3143.  The default position of the Bail Reform Act is that the release of a person on his or her 
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for permission to represent himself in a criminal proceeding pro-se.
265
  These rights are not self-
executing, as permission from the court or the involvement of another party is inherently needed 
to carry out these rights.  The government’s argument is therefore undermined by the fact that 
the right to remain silent exists even with the lack of any resources in any given moment, for 
remaining silent is in fact the exercise of the right that is protected.  Intuitively so, the privilege 
against self-incrimination during pre-arrest, pre-Miranda questioning does not and should not 
require a communication from the suspect.  
II. Analysis  
In Salinas v. Texas, the question remains as to the proper, constitutional treatment of pre-
arrest, pre-Miranda silence that defendants like Mr. Salinas appear to invoke.
266
  Respecting the 
right to remain silent in these situations comports with the policy considerations outlined in 
Miranda v. Arizona and the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment precedence on the self-
incrimination clause and right to remain silent.  The right to remain silent should only be 
subjected to prosecutorial comment if such comment falls within the exceptions that the Court 
has already carved out.  In the absence of such an exception, the Court should look to its past 
precedent for guidance.  This Comment has discussed the evolution of Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence that the Court can rely on in Salinas to find that the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda 
silence as substantive evidence of guilt is unconstitutional.  
As comprehensive as the Supreme Court’s silence precedent is, some cases are easily 
distinguishable from Salinas v. Texas and warrant addressing first.  Doyle, Jenkins, and Fletcher 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond is appropriate unless such release will not reasonably assure 
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§3142(b). 
265 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding that a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional 
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force a lawyer upon him when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense). 
266 Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 177 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2012), cert. granted, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 928 
(U.S. Jan. 11, 2013) (No. 12–246).   
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analyze silence for impeachment and are not determinative as to whether silence as substantive 
evidence of guilt is appropriate.
267
  Jenkins permits pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to impeach a 
defendant’s testimony at trial.268  The Jenkins holding was born out of evidentiary law on 
impeachment, where anyone who takes the witness stand puts his own credibility at issue and is 
subject to impeachment.
269
  In Salinas, Mr. Salinas did not testify, nonetheless, the prosecution 
used his pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence.  Although the Jenkins decision 
represents a more liberal treatment of silence, the holding does not require a contrary result than 
what is presently suggested.
270
  The Jenkins Court’s respect for the legitimacy of impeachment 
practice encouraged their approval of the use of the silence––a consideration not present in 
Salinas because Mr. Salinas did not testify and his silence was not used to impeach him.
271
   
In Doyle v. Ohio, the Court barred a prosecutor from using a defendant’s post-arrest, 
post-Miranda silence for impeachment.
272
  The prosecutor in Doyle impeached the defendant’s 
exculpatory story that was told for the first time at trial by cross-examining him on his failure to 
have told the story after receiving Miranda warnings.
273
  The Court noted the implicit guarantees 
of Miranda warnings encourage the defendant to remain silent and thus estop comment on post-
Miranda silence.
274
  While similar concerns arise in the pre-Miranda context–the defendant’s 
familiarly with the right to remain silent causing him to stay silent–Salinas is unique from 
Doyle.
275
  Because Mr. Salinas’ silence occurring before Miranda warnings, he never received 
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268 Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240. 
269 Id.; see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (holding that credibility can be impeached by use of an 
earlier inadmissible conflicting statement).  
270 Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
271 Id. at 177.  
272 Doyle, 426 U.S. at 620.   
273 Id. at 611.   
274 Id. at 618. 
275 Salinas, 369 S.W.3d at 177.  
 39 
the implicit guarantees that were discussed in Doyle.
276
  Therefore, the Court’s holding in Doyle 
is inapplicable to the Petitioner’s argument in Salinas, and this Comment’s suggestion, that pre 
arrest, pre-Miranda silence should be protected under the Fifth Amendment and not simply as a 
result of the recitation of Miranda warnings.
277
  
Although Fletcher v. Weir found no violation of the Fifth Amendment when the 
testifying defendant was cross-examined on his post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, the decision 
was likewise based on impeachment law.
278
  Even though the Court found that the defendant was 
not protected until Miranda warnings were issued, the Court did not discuss silence being used 
as substantive evidence; therefore, the holding does not speak to the present issue.
279
  
When following the Supreme Court’s other holding on silence to its logical conclusion, 
the Court must find that Salinas falls on equal ground with Griffin v. California and extend that 
holding to prohibit the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt.
280
  
There are, however, key differences between Salinas, involving pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence 
and Griffin, involving post-arrest, post-Miranda silence.  Griffin’s broad holding stated that a 
prosecutor could not comment on a defendant’s choice not to testify that trial, a form of post-
arrest, post-Miranda silence.
281
  The prosecutor asked the jury to infer from the defendant’s 
refusal to take the stand that he was guilty because an innocent person would have denied a false 
accusation.
282
  Without this prohibition, either decision the defendant in Griffin made, to answer 
the state’s questions and possibly incriminate himself, or remain silent and be harmed by 
implication, forced him to become a witness against himself.   
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The Salinas Court can draw an analogy between Griffin and Salinas because Mr. Salinas 
faced the same predicament that the Court ruled unconstitutional in Griffin.  Although Mr. 
Salinas had not been Mirandized during the questioning that resulted in his silence, unlike the 
defendant in Griffin, the difference is irrelevant.
283
  The Griffin rule did not evolve from a 
concern of coercion to speak, but rather the worry that a witness is unable to prevent himself 
from providing the government with evidence to use against him if he exercises his right not to 
testify.
284
  That reasoning is directly relevant to the situation presented in Salinas, where a 
suspect who remains silent is unwillingly giving the government evidence against him in the 
process.  The Seventh Circuit recognized this in Savory v. Lane when it eliminated the 
distinction between pre and post-Miranda silence and prohibited both at trial.
285
  It relied on 
Griffin’s rule that silence should not be evidence of guilt at trial and thus, found that silence in 
investigatory questioning could not be used since there is a “a constitutional right to say nothing 
at all about the allegations.”286 
Although the Supreme Court has already heavily limited the scope of Miranda’s 
protections,
287
 it should recognize in Salinas that criminal procedure rules still weigh in favor of 
protecting primary rights against government power in criminal cases.
288
  The Fifth Amendment 
“serves as a protection to the innocent as well as the guilty.”289  Miranda itself did not limit the 
right to remain silent solely at trial or custodial questioning.
290
  The right to remain silent applies 
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even in the absence of custodial interrogation.
291
  Regardless if an individual has been arrested or 
not, the principle remains the same: “while the police have the right to request citizens to answer 
voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to 
answer.”292  This does not negate the power of the Miranda warning and its admonition to 
remain silent–rather it reinforces the notion that even without Miranda warnings, a suspect 
should be able to remain silent by relying on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, a privilege that is merely alerted to arrestees in Miranda warnings as a precaution 
against compelled confessions. 
In his concurring opinion in Jenkins, Justice Stevens suggested that the key to analyzing 
the right against self-incrimination is whether the person was under an official compulsion to 
speak.
293
  If the Court in Salinas allows prosecutors to use silence as evidence of guilt, it would 
force suspects to speak during questioning, producing another type of a compelled confession 
that has long-since been banned by the Court.
294
  When an officer asks an individual, who may 
or may not know he is a suspect, about potential criminal activity, the situation presents the 
person with two options: to speak–which is generally ill-advised by defense attorneys–295or to 
stay silent.  If silence can then be used as evidence of guilt, it creates a punishment for exercising 
the right not to incriminate oneself and a compulsion to speak.  Invoking Miranda rights during 
later custodial interrogation would be futile, for the Miranda protections afforded to a suspect are 
cut down if they are administered after a suspect has already incriminated himself in the process 
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of remaining silent.  This double-edged sword cannot be constitutionally permissible as it is a 
variation of the “cruel trilemma” already abolished with the adoption of the Fifth Amendment.  
The burden of prosecution at trial, to prove an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, rests 
with the state instead of with the defendant.
296
  But, if prosecutors can use silence in the face of 
accusatory questions as a sign of guilt, then the burden shifts to the suspect in making the 
government’s case and impairs the privilege.  This practice turns a back to the interests protected 
in the Fifth Amendment and implicitly condones officers questioning suspects before formerly 
placing them under arrest, to purposely to circumvent Miranda’s protections.  
Because the impetus behind a defendant’s silence can be ambiguous, the Salinas Court 
may opt for a compromise to allow the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in situations if 
Court deems the defendant’s silence to be a tacit response to questioning that proves guilt, rather 
than an invocation of the right to remain silent and reliance on Miranda warnings.  The analysis 
of similar Fourth and Fifth Amendment suppression issues in federal courts makes it likely such 
a consideration would be undertaken through a motion to suppress, or a possible preliminary 
hearing in front of a magistrate judge, where the defendant would bear the burden of proof in 
showing a violation of rights causing the necessity for the suppression of evidence.
297
  
Unfortunately, such a test would create administrative problems and open the floodgates to a 
variety of permutations where the defendant’s motive for remaining silent is unclear.  The 
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motivation behind a suspect’s choice to remain silent can be a result of a multitude of factors, 
including his likely familiarity with the popular Miranda warnings and the Fifth Amendment.
298
  
An added difficulty arises when deciding from whose perspective silence should be evaluated.  
To view the silence from law enforcement’s perception would certainly pose a significant burden 
to defendants wishing to rebut the presumption of guilt.  To avoid this quagmire,
299
 a more 
tenable standard would forbid the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, making an invocation 
of the right unnecessary. 
In resolving the circuit split, the Supreme Court should easily be able to refute the 
reasoning of the courts that decline to protect un-Mirandized silence.
300
  The Fifth Amendment's 
protections cannot turn on when law enforcement chooses to read a list of judicially created 
statements that were merely intended to protect a substantive right.  To argue that the right does 
not manifest until warnings are given would nullify the privilege against self-incrimination, 
which existed in American jurisprudence long before Miranda v. Arizona was decided in 
1966.
301
  Thus, the recitation of the Miranda warning does not invoke the privileges and 
protections of the Fifth Amendment, for the right innately exist through the Bill of Rights.
302
  
Miranda warnings inform unaware defendants of their rights and safeguard the core 
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constitutional right protected by the self-incrimination clause by counterbalancing a suspect’s 
natural inclination to speak to officers in intimidating situations.
303
  The warnings do not trigger 
the force of the Fifth Amendment; they merely recite the existence of a right that is present 
regardless of whether a warning is given.
304
   
Finally, the justification that prosecutorial comment on pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is 
indicative of guilt is fundamentally flawed.  The Court has already held that silence during and 
after arrest is ambiguous and irrelevant to establish guilt.
305
  Silence is no more probative of guilt  
because it takes place before a suspect is read his Miranda rights.
306
 People may honestly believe  
that they have the right to remain silent when confronted with pre-arrest questioning, so it is 
impossible to conclude that a failure to speak is more consistent with guilt than with innocence.  
III. Conclusion 
The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled confessions and self-incrimination––a 
liberty that is rooted in American Jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court has protected these 
inalienable rights in the mass of cases leading up to and since the seminal decision, Miranda v. 
Arizona.  The trend of using pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt 
causes an egregious constitutional violation.  Looking forward to the pending case, I hope that 
the Supreme Court will appreciate the implications of this practice that has been jeopardizing 
defendant’s rights and finally strike down the constitutionally offensive practice with its 
forthcoming decision in Salinas v. Texas.  
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The Salinas Court has the unique ability to make a vast impact on criminal procedure and 
reinforce the goals of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. In light of the rich history behind the 
evolution and interpretation of the privilege, this Comment predicts that the Salinas Court will 
therefore reverse the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.  In doing so, the Court 
would join the circuits that recognize that the Fifth Amendment protects the right to remain silent 
during pre-arrest, pre-Miranda questioning.   
This Comment argues that the privilege against self-incrimination is invoked immediately 
whenever an individual is faced with investigatory questioning by law enforcement for the right 
innately exists through the Bill of Rights.  A clear rule that pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence 
cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt would ensure that defendants are not manipulated 
into forfeiting their constitutional rights.  When faced with police questioning, one should be 
abled to exercise the right to remain silent without the worry that his silence will be held against 
him at trial.  Such a decision would not require an upheaval of precedent, rather it would clearly 
support the Court’s prior decisions, including Miranda v. Arizona, that protect the citizen against 
compelled confessions and self-incrimination, which is the heart of the Fifth Amendment. 
Moreover, law enforcement and the prosecution would not be disadvantaged by such a rule.  If a 
defendant testifies in his own defense, prosecutors may still validly impeach the defendant’s 
testimony with pre-arrest silence, as allowed in Jenkins v. Anderson.  
But if the Court allows the use of this silence, the Court will divest citizens of the 
protections supposedly afforded by one of the most important constitutional protections we have 
as–– “No person . . .  shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” 
and sanction the use of compelled confessions, untethering the Fifth Amendment from the very 
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purpose for which it was enacted.
307
  Unless this practice is ruled unconstitutional, the threat 
remains that this silence represents an implicit confession and defendants like Genovevo Salinas 
will be convicted based on prejudicial evidence that the jury should never considered.   
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